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ARTICLES

A FRANCHISOR'S FLSA LIABILITY FOR ITS
FRANCHISEE'S WORKERS: WHY
OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER
EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS SHOULD
MAKE A FRANCHISOR A JOINT
EMPLOYER
Bryan Arbeit*
INTRODUCTION

The franchising model has been described as "a ubiquitous,
lucrative, and thriving business model."' The U.S. Census Bureau
reported that of the 295 industries for which franchising data was
collected in 2007, franchise businesses accounted for 7.9 million
workers out of a total workforce of 59 million.2 Despite the substantial
number of franchisee workers in the U.S. economy,3 determining when a
franchisor is jointly liable with a franchisee for violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") is far from an exact science.

* Bryan Arbeit is an associate at Wigdor LLP with significant experience in the areas of
employment and civil rights litigation. Bryan graduated in 2011 from Hofstra University School of
Law. At graduation, Bryan was awarded the Maurice A. Deane award for having the highest GPA
of the graduating class, the Gina Escarce Memorial Award for his contribution to student learning,
and Citations of Excellence in Labor and Employment and Torts Courses. The author would like to
thank his family, friends, colleagues, and a special someone for all their support and
encouragement.
1. Patterson v. Domino's Pizza, LLC, 333 P.3d 723, 725 (Cal. 2014).
2. Census Bureau's First Release of Comprehensive Franchise Data Shows Franchises
Make Up More than 10 Percent of Employer Businesses, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 14, 2010),
(reporting
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/economiccensus/cb10-141.html
that "franchise businesses accounted for nearly $1.3 trillion of the $7.7 trillion in total sales for
these industries, [and] $153.7 billion out of the $1.6 trillion in total payroll .... .").
3. See id. (demonstrating that more than 10% of employer businesses are franchises).
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In determining FLSA liability generally, district courts in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ("Second
Circuit") employ a number of factors from tests created by the Second
Circuit in response to different factual circumstances. 4 The Second
Circuit, however, has not yet examined an employment relationship
between a franchisor and its franchisee's workers.5 This Article
advocates for courts and practitioners to consider the operational control
of a franchisor over the employment conditions of franchisee workers as
the primary factor to determine an employment relationship between a
franchisor and its franchisee's workers.
Specifically, when the
franchisor can control the employment conditions of a franchisee
worker-through requiring uniformity of operations in the franchised
locations-then a franchisee worker should be considered an employee
of the franchisor under the FLSA's broad definition of an employee.
Part I discusses the statutory text of the FLSA and how the term
"employee" under the FLSA is broadly defined to include those who
employers "suffer or permit work," while other remedial statutes fail to
provide such extensive coverage. Part II of this Article discusses the
leading joint employment cases from the Supreme Court of the United
States ("Supreme Court") and the Second Circuit. Part III discusses the
franchise model's strong emphasis on uniformity of operations. Part IV
discusses why operational control over a worker's employment
conditions should be the primary factor in determining an employment
relationship between a franchisor and its franchisee's workers. Part IV
also demonstrates how franchisor FLSA joint employer liability can
incentivize franchisors to enforce compliance with the FLSA while at
the same time protecting against liability by requiring franchisees to sign
indemnification agreements and purchase employment practices liability
insurance.
I. THE FLSA AND THE BROAD DEFINITION OF EMPLOYEE

Subject to some exceptions, the FLSA defines "employee" to mean
6
"any individual employed by an employer." The FLSA in turn defines
4. See infra Part II-IV. The Second Circuit has noted the "fact-intensive character of the
joint employment inquiry. . . ." Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 76, n.13 (2d Cir. 2003).
5. See Cordova v. SCCF, Inc., No. 13ClV5665-LTS-HP, 2014 WL 3512838, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2014) ("The Second Circuit has not yet considered whether a franchisor can
qualify as a joint employer. . .").
6. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (2012). The FLSA obligates (subject to
exemptions) that "[elvery employer shall pay to each of his employees" the minimum wage
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"employ" as including "to suffer or permit to work."7 Taken together,
an "employee" under the FLSA is any individual who an employer
suffers or permits to work.8 Additionally, the definition of employer
broadly "includes any person' acting directly or indirectly in the interest
of an employer in relation to an employee."o
In Walling v. PortlandTerminal Co., the Supreme Court explained
that the FLSA "contains its own definitions, comprehensive enough to
require its application to many persons and working relationships which,
prior to [the FLSA], were not deemed to fall within an employer-

employee category."" The legislative history of the FLSA supports the
assertion that "the term 'employee' had been given 'the broadest
definition that has ever been included in any one act."' 1 2 The Supreme
Court has stated a "broader or more comprehensive coverage of
employees ... would be difficult to frame."' 3

The definition of employee under the FLSA is remarkably broad in

specified in the statute. Id. § 206(a). The FLSA also mandates (also subject exemptions) that "no
employer shall employ any of his employees" for more than forty hours unless that employee is paid
time and a half for the hours worked over forty. Id. § 207(a). "Any employer who violates the
[minimum wage and overtime] provisions of [the FLSA] shall be liable to the employee or
employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime
compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages." Id. §
216(b). While the statutory text of the FLSA makes an employer only liable to his employees, the
definition of employee is exceedingly broad under the FLSA. See id. § 203(e), 206(a).
7. Id. § 203(g).
8. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e), (g).
9. A "person" is broadly defined as "an individual, partnership, association, corporation,
business trust, legal representative, or any organized group of persons." Id. § 203(a).
10. Id. § 203(d).
11. Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150-51 (1947). Bruce Goldstein et al.,
explain:
[T]he language of the definition is expansive because the meanings of the words, "to
permit" and "to suffer," are very broad. "Suffer," according to the distillation in Corpus
Juris Secundum, "may convey the negative idea of passivity, indifference, or abstaining
from preventive action, as distinguished from a demonstrative, active course or from an
affirmative act.... It has been said that to suffer an act usually implies the power to
prohibit, prevent, or hinder it, and that to suffer an act to be done by a person who can
preventit is to permit or consent to it, to approve of it, and not to hinder it.
Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern American Sweatshop:
Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REv. 983, 1103 (1999)
(emphasis added).
12. See United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 (1945) ("The use of the words
'each' and 'any' to modify 'employee' which in turn is defined to include 'any' employed
individuals, leaves no doubt as to the congressional intention to include all employees within the
scope of the Act unless specifically excluded."). Id. at 363, n.3.
13. Id. at 362.
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comparison to other remedial statutes.1 4 In comparing the FLSA to the
Employee Retirement Security Income Act ("ERISA"), the Supreme
Court in Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, explained:
The definition of "em loyee" in the FLSA evidently derives from the
child labor statutes, and, on its face, goes beyond its ERISA
counterpart. While the FLSA, like ERISA, defines an "employee" to
include "any individual employed by an employer," it defines the verb
"employ" expansively to mean "suffer or permit to work." This latter
definition, whose striking breadth we have previously noted, stretches
the meaning of "employee" to cover some parties who might not
qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency law
principles. ERISA lacks any such provision, however, and the textual
asymmetry between the two statutes precludes reliance on FLSA cases
when construing ERISA's concept of "employee." 16
For statutes like ERISA and Title VII, which do not define
"employ" as "suffer and permit" like the FLSA,1 7 the Supreme Court has
restricted the scope of employees under these statutes to common-law
agency. 18 In situations where the Supreme Court has interpreted statutes
such as the National Labor Relations Act19 and Social Security Act more

14. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 290.500(3) (2007); Labor Peace Act of 1943, COLO. REV.
STAT. § 8-3-104(11) (1997).
15. The term "suffer or permit" was incorporated from state child labor laws that existed at
the time the FLSA was enacted. Richard J. Burch, A Practitioner'sGuide to Joint Employer
Liability Under the FLSA, 2 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 393, 401 (2002); see also Goldstein et al.,
supra note 11, at 1136-38 (explaining that in the child labor law setting there was a goal "to impose
a duty on firms to police their workplaces and premises").

16.

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (4th Cir. 1992) (citations

omitted).

17. See, e.g., Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2012) (defining "employee" to mean "an
individual employed by an employer" but not defining "employ").
18. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 323 (explaining that there is a presumption that Congress means
an agency law definition for 'employee' unless it clearly indicates otherwise).
19. It should be noted that the NLRA is textually different than the FLSA, and may make an
employer potentially liable to both his own and any employee. To illustrate, the NLRA makes it an
unfair labor practice for an employer "to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee
because he has filed charges or given testimony under this sub-chapter" or "to interfere with,

restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title." 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (4) (2012) (emphasis added). Meanwhile, the NLRA makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees." Id. § 158(a)(5) (emphasis added). The more restricted possessive "his" for one unfair
labor practice should be interpreted to mean that other unfair labor practices do not require the
employees to be considered employed by the particular employer in order to constitute a violation

under the act. In the franchising context this distinction is significant. See NLRB Office of the
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broadly than intended, Congress subsequently amended those statutes
"to demonstrate that the usual common-law principles were the keys to
[those statutes'] meaning." 20 As one scholar notes, "the broadness of the
FLSA's scope eclipses even that of other 'remedial' legislation, such as
the various civil rights acts." 21
One scholar explains that the "suffer or permit to work" definition
results in the "broadest category of coverage precisely because it not
only subsumes workers who are controlled by and/or economically
dependent on employers, but because it also embraces those whose work
a business owner can prevent even though he does not physically control
their work and they are not economically dependent on him." 2 2 Given
the remarkably broad scope of employees covered by the FLSA, an

General Counsel Issues Consolidated Complaints Against McDonald's Franchisees and their
FranchisorMcDonald's, USA, LLC as Joint Employers, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-office-general-counsel-issuesconsolidated-complaints-against. Recently, the National Labor Relations Board Office of the
General Counsel issued complaints against McDonald's franchisees and their franchisor,
McDonald's USA, LLC, as joint employers. Id. The complaints allege the rights of workers were
violated by the franchisor and franchisees "by, among other things, making statements and taking
actions against them for engaging in activities aimed at improving their wages and working
conditions, including participating in nationwide fast food worker protests about their terms and
conditions of employment during the past two years." Id. While the National Labor Relations
Board seeks to hold the franchisor liable as a "joint employer," the statutory text of the NLRA does
not appear to require the franchisee workers to actually work for the franchisor since the statute
makes it more broadly an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, retrain, or coerce
employees" rather than "his employees." See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(1); NLRB Office of the General
Counsel Issues Consolidated Complaints Against McDonald's Franchisees and their Franchisor
McDonald's, USA, LLC as Joint Employers, supra.
20. Darden, 503 U.S. at 324-25.
21. Burch, supra note 15, at 402; see also Goldstein et al., supra note 11, at 1104 ("The
Supreme Court has acknowledged this definition's 'striking breadth,' calling it 'comprehensive
enough to require its application to many persons and working relationships which, prior to this Act,
were not deemed to fall within an employer-employee category."' (quoting Walling v. Portland
Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150-51 (1947))).
22. Goldstein et al., supra note II, at 1122; see also Darden, 503 U.S. at 326 (noting that the
"suffer or permit to work" formulation "stretches the meaning of 'employee' to cover some parties
who might not qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency law principles");
Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947) (explaining that, under the economic reality test,
"employees" are not limited to those who are subject to the physical control of an employer).
Goldstein et al. have explained that:
[T]here was an explicit direction that the definition should be designed "to prevent the
circumvention of the Act or any of its provisions through the use of agents, independent
contractors, subsidiary or controlled companies, or home or off-premise employees, or
by any other means or device." A broad definition of "employee," including "any
individual suffered or permitted to work by an employer," subsequently took the place of
this provision.
Goldstein et al., supra note 11, at I100 (citation omitted).
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employment relationship between a franchisor and its franchisee's
workers should exist where a franchisor has control over the worker's
employment conditions (and profits from the work).
II. LEADING JOINT EMPLOYMENT CASES

This Section discusses the leading joint employment cases from the
U.S. Supreme Court and the Second Circuit.23 Courts recognize that
'[t]he determination of the employment relationship does not depend on
such isolated factors' as where work is done or how compensation is
divided 'but rather upon the circumstances of the whole activity."' 24
This concept has been generally termed the "economic realities" test. 2 5
The Supreme Court and Second Circuit in the limited cases analyzing a
joint employment relationship under the FLSA '"identifly] different sets
of relevant factors based on the factual challenges posed by particular
cases."'26
A. Supreme Court Joint Employment Cases

Courts have described Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb to be the
leading Supreme Court case dealing with joint employment. 27 The
Second Circuit used factors from Rutherford when the Court ruled on a

23.

Federal Regulations provide that entities will be considered joint employers:
Where the employers are not completely disassociated with respect to the

employment of a particular employee and may be deemed to share control of the
employee, directly or indirectly, by reason of the fact that one employer controls, is
controlled by, or is under common control with the other employer.
29 C.F.R. § 791.2(b)(3) (1938). A "single individual may stand in the relation of an employee to
two or more employers at the same time under the [FLSA]." Id. § 791.2(a). "A determination of
whether the employment by the employers is to be considered joint employment or separate and

distinct employment for purposes of the act depends upon all the facts in the particular case." Id.
24. Irizarry v. Catsimatidis, 722 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Rutherford Food Corp.
v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947)) ("The Second Circuit 'has treated employment for FLSA
purposes as a flexible concept to be determined on a case-by-case basis by review of the totality of
the circumstances . . . ." (emphasis added)).

25.

See id. at .104 ("The 'economic reality' test applies equally to whether workers are
&

employees and to whether managers or owners are employers."); Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health

Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Because the economic realities test depends
on the totality of the circumstances arising in a particular employer-employee context, our decision

today is limited to the facts of this case.").
26. Irizarry, 722 F.3d at 104 (quoting Barfield, 537 F.3d at 141-42).
27. See, e.g., Liu v. Donna Karan Int'l, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4221, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18847,
at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2000); Lopez v. Silverman, 14 F. Supp. 2d 405, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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joint employment case. 2 8 Rutherford was also decided shortly after the
enactment of the FLSA, setting the precedent for future cases. 29
In Rutherford, a slaughterhouse contracted with an experienced
meat boner to assemble a group of boners to perform the boning work at
the slaughterhouse. 3 0 The contracted boner would be paid an amount
based on the weight boned and "would have complete control over the
other boners, who would be his employees."3 ' The slaughterhouse
would provide a room in the plant for the work and slaughterhouse
employees and equipment would be used to move the meat in and out of
the room. 32 From 1942 to 1944, several boners contracted with the
slaughterhouse, each one being an employee of the former contracted
boner.
The District Court found "that since the boning work had
started in 1942, the money paid by [slaughterhouse] had been shared
equally among all the boners, except for a short time after [one boner]
took over the work when he paid some of the boners by the hour."3 4 It
was stipulated that the boners owned their own tools, which consisted of
a hook, a knife, a sharpener, and a leather belt.3 5 The boners were not
members of the slaughterhouse union even though written contracts
provided they should join.36
The Supreme Court examined the nature of the boners' business in
relation to the slaughterhouse.3 7 The Supreme Court explained that
boning was part of a "series of interdependent steps" in the
slaughterhouse operations.38
After the cattle were slaughtered and
prepared by slaughterhouse employees for boning, the boners would cut
off the meat into the barrels for slaughterhouse employees to prepare for
shipment. 39 The slaughterhouse "never attempted to control the hours of
the boners," but they were required to meet the demand of the
slaughterhouse and "the president and manager of [the slaughterhouse
would go] through the boning area many times a day and '[was] after the

28. See Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 2003).
29. See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947). Rutherford was decided in
1947, and the FLSA was enacted in 1938. Id. at 722-23.
30. Id. at 724.
31. Id. at 724-25.
32. Id. at 725.
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 725-26, 730.
38. Id. at 725.
39. Id. at 726.
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boners frequently about their failure to cut all of the. meat off the
bones."'

40

The Supreme Court concluded that the meat boners were
employees of the slaughterhouse and not independent contractors. 4 1 The
District Court had focused on the right to contract and found that the
boners sharing money equally was common and most of the boners had
at various times worked at other plants under independent contractors.4 2
The Supreme Court rejected the District Court's reasoning and held that
"the determination of the [employment] relationship does not depend on
such isolated factors but rather upon the circumstances of the whole
activity." 43 "Viewed in this way," the Court considered that the boners
were part of a production line, responsibility under the boning contracts
passed from one boner to another without material change, the premises
and equipment of the slaughterhouse was used for the work, the boning
group had:
no business organization that could or did shift as a unit from one
slaughterhouse to another,... [t]he managing official of the plant kept
close touch on the operation, . . . [and profitability was] more like
piecework than an enterprise that actually depended for success upon
the initiative, judgment or foresight of the typical independent
contractor.44

Based "[u]pon the whole," the Supreme Court concluded the boners
were employees of the slaughterhouse, including those employed by the
managing boner.45
The second leading case in the joint employment context is Falk v.
Brennan.4 6 In Falk, the Supreme Court held that the real estate
management service company Drucker & Falk ("D & F") and apartment
owners were joint employers of apartment maintenance workers.47
"Under its contracts with the apartment owners, D & F agree[d] to
perform, on behalf of each [apartment complex] owner and under his
nominal supervision, virtually all management functions that are

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See id.
See id. at 729.
See id. at 729-30.
See id. at 730.
Id.
See id.
See Donald F. Kiesling, Jr., Title VII and the Temporary Employment Relationship, 32

VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 10 (1997).

47.

See Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 195 (1973).
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ordinarily -required for the proper functioning of an apartment
complex." 4 8 The maintenance workers at issue in the case worked under
the supervision of D & F, were paid from the rental income of the
apartment complex where they worked, and were "considered in the
contracts between the [apartment] owners and D & F as 'employees of
the project owners."' 4 9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer this question: "Are
maintenance workers employed at the buildings managed by [D & F]
employees of the apartment owner or of [D & F]?"50 In answering this
question, the Supreme Court held "it is clear that the maintenance
workers are employees of the building [apartment complex] owners."
Additionally, the Supreme Court believed "that the Court of Appeals
was unquestionably correct in holding that D & F [was] also an
'employer' of the maintenance workers" because the FLSA "defines
'employer' as 'any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of
an employer in relation to an employee"' and "'employee' to include
'any individual employed by an employer."' 52 Considering the "view of
the expansiveness of the [FLSA's] definition of 'employer' and the
extent of D & F's managerial responsibilities at each of the [apartment]
buildings, which gave it substantial control 53 of the terms and conditions
of the work of these employees," the Supreme Court held that D & F
was also an employer of the maintenance workers.54
Rutherford and Falk both illustrate the expansive scope of the term
"employee" under the FLSA.
However, they do not easily answer the
question of an employment relationship between a franchisor and its
franchisee's worker, where control is typically exerted indirectly through
the requirements on the franchise. 56

48. Id. at 192.
49. Id. at 193.
50. Id. at 195.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. In Carter v. Dutchess, the Second Circuit noted that since the Supreme Court referred to
the amount of control exercised by D & F over the workers as substantial, "[tihe fair inference is
that ultimate control was exercised by the apartment owners." Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735
F.2d 8, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1984).
54. Falk, 414 U.S. at 195.
55. See id.; Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728-29 (1947).
56. See discussion infra Part IV.
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B. Second Circuit LeadingJoint Employment Cases
The Second Circuit has had to determine whether a joint
employment relationship existed in a number of different factual
circumstances. In Carter v. Dutchess Community College ("Carter"),
the Second Circuit was confronted with the question of whether
Defendant Dutchess Community College ("DCC"), who used prison
inmates 5 7 as tutors, could be considered an employer even though the
Department of Correctional Services ("DCS") had the ultimate control
In discussing the FLSA, the Second Circuit
over the prisoners.
explained that:
The "economic reality" test since has been refined and now is
understood to include inquiries into: "whether the alleged employer (1)
had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and
controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3)
determined the rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained
employment records." 59
The Second Circuit also explained that "[t]he power to control a
worker clearly is a crucial factor in determining whether an employment
relationship exists" but rejected the argument that such control over the
"worker must be 'ultimate' in order to justify a finding of an employeremployee relationship." 60 The Second Circuit reasoned that:
The statute is a remedial one, written in the broadest possible terms so
that the minimum wage provisions would have the widest possible
impact in the national economy. It runs counter to the breadth of the
statute and to the Congressional intent to impose a qualification which
permits an employer who exercises substantial control over a worker,
but whose hiring decisions occasionally may be subjected to a third
party's veto, to escape compliance with the Act.61

57.

The Second Circuit also had to determine whether prisoners were entitled to the protection

of the FLSA; the court concluded they were. Carter, 735 F.2d at 15.
58. Id. at 12. The Second Circuit has also looked to a traditional test that "arises out of the
common law of agency and focuses primarily on the 'hiring party's right to control the manner and
means by which the product is accomplished."' Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 89 (2d Cir.
1993) (quoting Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989)). However,
this traditional test has for the most part been incorporated into the Carter factors.
59. Carter, 735 F.2d at 12 (quoting Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d
1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983)). These four factors are known as the Carterfactors. See id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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Applying the four factors, the Second Circuit reversed the dismissal
of the FLSA claim and allowed the prison inmate to proceed with his
claim against DCC.62
In a contracting out case, Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co. ("Zheng"),
the Second Circuit decided whether Liberty Appeal Company, Inc.
("Liberty"), a "jobber" in the garment industry,63 could be considered a
joint employer to the workers of a separate corporation, Contractor
Corporations. 4 Contractor Corporations had contracts with Liberty to
assemble garments for Liberty.65 The District Court dismissed the case
because it found that Liberty had not exercised any of the Carter
factors.66 After reviewing its prior cases, the Second Circuit clarified
that it "never suggested that, in analyzing joint employment, the four
Carter factors alone are relevant, and that other factors that bear on the
relationship between workers and potential joint employers should be
ignored." 67 The Second Circuit decided that "the broad language of the
FLSA, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Rutherford, demands that
a district court look beyond an entity's formal right to control the
physical performance of another's work before declaring that the entity
is not an employer under the FLSA." 68 The Second Circuit vacated the
dismissal and remanded to the District Court to determine whether
Liberty was a joint employer. 6 9 The Second Circuit instructed the
District Court that the determination should be based on "the
circumstances of the whole activity.

. .

. viewed in the light of economic

reality." 70

The Court thought the District Court would find the factors
from Rutherford "illuminating in these circumstances."
The factors
were:
(1) whether Liberty's premises and equipment were used for the
plaintiffs' work; (2) whether the Contractor Corporations had a
business that could or did shift as a unit from one putative joint

62. Id. at 14-15.
63. A "jobber ... is a manufacturing company that contracts out the last phase of its
production process." Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 2003).
64. Id. at 63-64.
65. Id at 64.
66. Id. at 66.
67. Id. at 68.
68. Id. at 69.
69. Id. at 71.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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employer to another; (3) the extent to which plaintiffs performed a
discrete line-job that was integral to Liberty's process of production;
(4) whether responsibility under the contracts could pass from one
subcontractor to another without material changes; (5) the degree to
which the Liberty Defendants or their agents supervised plaintiffs'
work; and (6) whether plaintiffs worked exclusively or predominantly
for the Liberty Defendants. 72
The Second Circuit explained "[t]hese particular factors are
relevant because, when they weigh in plaintiffs' favor, they indicate that
an entity has functional control over workers even in the absence of the
formal control measured by the Carter factors." 73 The Second Circuit
also instructed the District Court that it was "free to consider any other
factors it deems relevant to its assessment of the economic realities." 74
The Second Circuit has addressed the issue of an individual and
corporation being joint employers.75 More recently, in Irizarry v.
Catsimatidis ("Irizarry"), the Second Circuit addressed two legal issues
mentioned in the earlier case. 76 In Irizarry, the plaintiffs had moved for
partial summary judgment to determine whether John Catsimatidis
("Catsimatidis"), the chairman and CEO of Gristede's Foods, Inc., could
be held personally liable for damages as their employer.
In deciding
the case, the Court noted two legal questions mentioned in its prior
decision: the scope of operational control over a company and
hypothetical versus actual power.
Addressing the first question of
operational control, 7 9 Catsimatidis argued "that he was a high-level
employee who made . .. decisions that only affected the lives of the
plaintiffs through an attenuated chain of but-for causation" and "that a
FLSA 'employer' must exercise decision-making in a 'day-to-day'

72. Id. at 72.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 71-72.
75. Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999).
76. Irizarry v. Catsimatidis, 722 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2013).
77. Id. at 101-02. The district court had found Catsimatidis was an employer, based on the
finding that "'[t]here is no area of Gristede's which is not subject to [Catsimatidis's] control,
whether [or not] he chooses to exercise it,' and that, therefore, Catsimatidis 'had operational control
and, as such, [ ] may be held to be an employer."' Id. at 103 (quoting Torres v. Gristede's Operation
Corp., No. 04 Civ. 3316 (PAC), 2011 WL 4571792, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2011) (alterations in
original)).
78. Id. at 106. In the joint enterprise context, the Federal Regulations explain "control" as "the
act of fact of controlling; power or authority to control; directing or restraining domination.

'Control' thus includes the power or authority to control." 29 C.F.R. § 779.221 (2014).
79. Irizarry, 722 F.3d at 106-07 ("'Operational control' is at the heart of this case.").
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Plaintiffs countered, contending "that many cases have

found individuals with 'operational control' on a more general level to
be employers."8 After reviewing the decisions of other circuits, the
Second Circuit held:
Evidence that an individual is an owner or officer of a company, or
otherwise makes corporate decisions that have nothing to do with an
employee's function, is insufficient to demonstrate "employer" status.
Instead, to be an "employer," an individual defendant must possess
control over a company's actual "operations" in a manner that relates
to a plaintiffs employment.
It is appropriate, as we implicitly
recognized in RSR, to require some degree of individual involvement
in a company in a manner that affects employment-related factors such
as workplace conditions and operations, personnel, or compensationeven if this appears to establish a higher threshold for individual
82
liability than for corporate "employer" status.

Accordingly, the Second Circuit explained that "[a] person
exercises operational control over employees if his or her role within the
company, and the decisions it entails, directly affect the nature or
conditions of the employees' employment., 83 The Second Circuit
clarified that in determining whether operational control exists, there is
no requirement that an individual employer be "personally complicit in
FLSA violations." 84 "The statute provides an empty guarantee absent a
financial incentive for individuals with control, even in the form of
delegated authority, to comply with the law, and courts have continually
emphasized the extraordinarily generous interpretation the statute is to
The Second Circuit further clarified that while the
be given."85
individual employer does not need to "be responsible for managing
plaintiff employees-or, indeed. . . [to] directly come into contact with
the plaintiffs, their workplaces, or their schedules-the relationship
between the individual's operational function and the plaintiffs'
employment must be closer in degree than simple but-for causation., 86
As for the second question of actual versus hypothetical power, the
Second Circuit left open the question whether "unexercised authority is

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 107.
Id.
Id. at 109.
Id. at 110.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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insufficient to establish FLSA liability" since authority had been
exercised in the case. 87 However, the Second Circuit discussed an
Eleventh Circuit case which "squarely held that even when a defendant
'could have played a greater role in the day-to-day operations of the []
facility if he had desired . .. unexercised authority is insufficient to
establish liability as an employer." 88 The Irizarry Court indicated that
there needs to be "some involvement in the company's employment of
the employees" to have individual liability.89
After exploring these two legal questions, the Second Circuit
proceeded to apply the "economic reality" test to "decide whether
Catsimatidis [was] an employer under the FLSA." 90 Specifically, the
Second Circuit asked, "[i]s there 'evidence showing [Catsimatidis']
authority over management, supervision, and oversight of [Gristedes']
affairs in general,' as well as evidence under the Carter framework or
any other factors that reflect Catsimatidis's exercise of direct control
over the plaintiff employees?" 91 Although characterizing the facts of the
case as a "close" one, the Second Circuit found Catsimatidis to be an
employer under the FLSA.92
The Second Circuit has yet to be faced with the factual scenario of
a franchisor-franchisee worker relationship.93 District courts in the

87. Id. at 111.
88. Id. (first omission in original) (quoting Alvarez Perez v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club,
Inc., 515 F.3d 1150, 1161 (11th Cir. 2008)).
89. See id.
90. Id. (quoting Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 140 (2d Cir.1999)).
91. Id. (third alteration in original) (citation omitted). Specifically, the Second Circuit
reviewed any evidence of the individual defendant's "overall authority," id., "involvement with
stores," id. at 113, and the individual Carter factors of whether the defendant: "had the power to
hire and fire employees," "supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of
employment," "determined the rate and method of payment," or "maintained employment records."
Id. at 114-16 (quoting Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 2008)).
92. Id. at 116-17.
93. See supra note 5. Recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a jury verdict and
award of damages for violations of the FLSA entered against the individual owner of a franchise.
Orozco v. Plackis, 757 F.3d 445, 452 (5th Cir. 2014). The Fifth Circuit focused mainly on the
Carter formal factors. Id. at 448 (quoting Gray v. Powers, 673 F.3d 352, 355 (5th Cir. 2012)). The
Fifth Circuit downplayed the significance of the terms of the franchise agreement, describing a
provision of the franchise agreement requiring the franchisee to follow "policies and procedures
promulgated by the franchisor for selection, supervision, or training of personnel" as an "innocuous
statement." Id. at 452 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Third Circuit affirmed the granting of
summary judgment to Enterprise Holdings, Inc., a franchisor of Enterprise Rent-a-Car. In re Enter.

Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp't Practices Litig., 683 F.3d 462, 471 (3d Cir. 2012). The court held
that "plaintiffs produced no evidence that Enterprise Holdings, Inc.'s actions at any time amounted

to mandatory directions rather than mere recommendations." Id. at 470. Given the nature of the
franchise business, and requirement for uniformity, it is unclear how the court was able to determine
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Second Circuit that have been confronted with the issue of franchisor
liability under FLSA have used a combination of the formal and
functional control factors from Carter and Zheng.9 4 For example, in
Cordova v. SCCF, Inc., the district court stated that "Carter and Zheng
thus establish 'a nonexclusive and overlapping set of factors to ensure
that the economic realities test mandated by the Supreme Court is
sufficiently comprehensive and flexible to give proper effect to the broad
language of the FLSA . . . ."'95 However, this Article asserts that
because the nature of the franchise business model focuses on the
uniformity of operations among franchisees, courts and practitioners
should look to the operational control of a franchisor over its
franchisee's workers employment conditions as the primary factor for
determining an employment relationship.
III. UNIFORMITY AS PART OF THE FRANCHISEE BUSINESS MODEL

In Patterson v. Domino's Pizza, L.L.C., the California Supreme
Court explained that "[a] franchisor, which can have thousands of stores
located far apart, imposes comprehensive and meticulous standards for
marketing its trademarked brand and operating its franchises in a
uniform way." 96 Uniformity is important for customer expectations and

these directions were treated as mandatory or not. In most instances, it should be a factual question
for the jury to determine, not a motion for summary judgment when facts should be construed in
favor of the non-moving party. Additionally, given the role a franchisor plays among it franchises,
it is difficult to reconcile how the Third Circuit was able to conclude that it was "readily apparent []
that Enterprise Holdings exercised no control, let alone significant control, over the assistant
managers." Id. at 471.
94. See, e.g., Benitez v. Demco of Riverdale, L.L.C., No. 14 Civ. 7074(CM), 2015 WL
803069, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2015) (stating that "[elconomic reality is largely a function of four
[Carter] factors" and that "other factors can mix [in]"); Cordova v. SCCF, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 5665LTS-HP, 2014 WL 3512838, at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2014); Olvera v. Bareburger Group,
L.L.C., 2014, No. 14 Civ. 1372(PAE), 2014 WL 3388649, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2014); Cano v.
DPNY, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 251, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (stating that the Carterfactors are sufficient but
not necessary to establish an employment relationship and that functional control may be sufficient).
95. Cordova, 2014 WL 3512838, at *4.
96. Patterson v. Domino's Pizza, L.L.C., 333 P.3d 723, 725-26 (Cal. 2014); see Sean
Obermeyer, Note, Resolving the Catch 22: Franchisor Vicarious Liability for Employee Sexual
HarassmentClaims Against Franchisees,40 IND. L. REv. 611, 616 (2007) ("Strict adherence by the
franchisee to the franchisor's system is a hallmark of the business format model."). In Pattersonv.
Domino'sPizza, L.L.C., the Court further elaborated that:
Under the [franchise] business format model, the franchisee pays royalties and fees for
the right to sell products or services under the franchisor's name and trademark. In the
process, the franchisee also acquires a business plan, which the franchisor has crafted for
all of its stores. This business plan requires the franchisee to follow a system of
standards and procedures. A long list of marketing, production, operational, and
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franchisor success. 9 7 The amount of control over a franchised business
may vary depending on the nature of services or products and the
particular desires of the franchisor.9 8 Ways to evaluate the extent of
franchisor control over a franchised business include reviewing: (1) the
process of obtaining a franchisee; (2) the terms of the franchised
agreement; (3) policies, manuals, guidelines, and training programs
promulgated by the franchisor; 99 (4) the extent franchisor's employees or
agents are involved in the business operations of the franchisor; 0 0 and
(5) the extent the franchisor reviews or performs oversight over the
franchisor operations. 0 1
Obtaining uniformity of operations in the franchised locations is
designed to ensure the franchised product meets consumer
expectations.1 0 2 The Economics of Franchising explains "it is the
consistency of system's operations, service, and product quality that
attracts customers and induces loyalty: customers become loyal if the

administrative areas is typically involved. The franchisor's system can take the form of
printed manuals, training programs, advertising services, and managerial support, among

other things.
Patterson,333 P.3d at 733 (citations omitted).
97. Obermeyer, supra note 96, at 616 (explaining that the success and growth of franchising
is due to the consumer's preference for "proven quality and uniformity in goods and services" and
the franchisor ensuring consistency "by creating, marketing, and ultimately enforcing its system").

&

98. See Raymond G. McGuire, The Labor Law Aspects of Franchising, 13 B.C. INDUS.
COM. L. REv. 215, 224-25 (1971).
99. For example, "7-Eleven franchisees complete an in-depth orientation comprised of
interactive classroom sessions, completed at the 7-Eleven Store Support Center in Dallas" and then
undergo "self-paced in-store training."
Industry Leading Training and Support, 7-ELEVEN
FRANCHISE, http://franchise.7-eleven.com/franchise/training-support (last visited Apr. 6, 2015). For
store employees, "7-Eleven offers in-store training sessions as well as computer-based training
modules that are interactive, trackable, and consistently updated to keep employees at the forefront
of 7-Eleven customer service standards." Id.
100. Cf The 7-Eleven Business Consultant, 7-ELEVEN FRANCHISE, http://franchise.7-

eleven.com/franchise/business-consulting (last visited Apr. 6, 2015) ("7-Eleven provides all
franchisees with a Business Consultant who visits in-store, once a week, to help with all the
challenges involved with running the business.").

101.

See Patterson, 333 P.3d at 744 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).

For example, a franchisor, pursuing its legitimate interest in ensuring that customers

enjoy a similar experience in each franchised location, may implement the franchise
agreement in various ways, including ways short of day-to-day oversight, to exercise
control over employee selection, training, personal appearance, interaction with
customers, and compliance with in-store procedures. This retention of control by the
franchisor, enforced by regular inspections ard the threat that a noncompliant
franchisee will be placed in default, presents occasions for the franchisor to act as an
employer by forcing the termination ofproblematic employees.

Id. (emphasis added).
102. See Obermeyer, supra note 96, at 616.
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experiences they enjoy at diverse units of these chains routinely meet
their expectations."10 3 Dairy Queen lists several reasons why someone
might consider opening one of its franchises, including a "[p]roven
business model with a 70-year history" and "[s]trong customer loyalty
and relationship with the brand."1 0 4 In deciding In re EnterpriseRent-ACar Wage & Hour Employment, the Third Circuit noted "[t]he
Enterprise website does not draw any distinction between Enterprise
Holdings, Inc. or its 38 subsidiaries, and represents that 'Enterprise
Rent-a-Car' has a fleet of nearly 900,000 rental vehicles, 64,000
employees, and 6,900 offices throughout the world." 05 John Schnatter,
known to most people as "Papa" John, states in a video on franchising
that he is "really proud of the 80,000 team members that wake up every
day and make Papa John's Better Ingredients, Better Pizza promise
come to life."l 0 6 Sean Obermeyer explains the potential harm a lack of
uniformity presents: "[s]ince consistency and uniformity of operations
play such a central role in modem business format franchising,
franchisors have a legitimate concern that a wayward franchisee might
do considerable harm to the franchisor's brand image and, consequently,
7
to its ultimate profitability."o
Franchisors must enforce uniformity, because without enforcement,
an individual franchisee is incentivized to increase profits margins by
offering lower quality products or services while still capitalizing on the
franchisor's name to attract new customers. 0 8 It has been reported that
enforcement has become stricter over time, with most franchisors
retaining "the right to periodically inspect franchised locations to ensure
compliance with the franchise agreement" and retaining the "right to
terminate the relationship if the franchisee's performance is
inadequate."' 09
Franchisors are not shy about their control over uniformity." 0 In a

103.

ROGER D. BLAIR & FRANCINE LAFONTAINE, THE ECONOMICS OF FRANCHISING

117

(2005).
http://www.dairyqueen.com/usQUEEN,
DAIRY
Us,
with
104. Franchise
en/Company/Franchise-With-Us/Franchise-With-Us (last visited Apr. 7, 2015).
105. In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp't Practices Litig., 683 F.3d 462, 465-66 n.8
(3d Cir. 2012).
106. Papajohns, An Invitation from "Papa" John-Founder, YOUTUBE (Oct. 9, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fiaFe4lOulk.
107. Obermeyer, supra note 96, at 619.
108. Id. at 619-20.
109. Id. at 620.
110. See id. at 611, 632-33; PopularSouth FloridaRestaurants Ordered Shut, LOCALIO.COM
(Dec. 19, 2014, 11:34 PM), http://www.locall0.com/news/popular-south-florida-restaurantsordered-shut/30328596.
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public statement, Tim McIntyre, Vice President of Communications for
Domino's, stated: "We are very serious about the quality and safety of
our food and would never consciously overlook health code regulations,
nor our own rigorous standards."'
Chick-fil-A explains that
"[franchise] [o]perators must successfully complete an extensive, multiweek training program prior to commencing operation of a franchised
Chick-fil-A Restaurant business."" 2
Jamba Juice states on its
franchising website that it will train both the franchisee and its staff to
help open new stores and the region franchise leader will also regularly
John Kimmins, President of Arthur Murray
visit the store."'3
International, Inc. (AMI), explained that the franchised Arthur Murray
dance studios are "contractually obligated to operate in accordance with
AMI's business formats, methods, standards and specifications, in order
to obtain uniformity of operations, as is typical in franchised
businesses."' 4
If a franchisor is controlling only the appearance of a store or a
physical product that is sold, there is a good argument that the
franchisor's involvement is too remote from the work of the franchisee's
workers to consider the franchisor to be a joint employer."'5 However, if
the franchisor at the operational level controls how franchisee workers
performs services for customers or other terms and conditions of
employment, then this type of operational control likely justifies treating
the franchisor as a joint employer even if the franchisor is not involved
in the day-to-day employment decisions."16

111. PopularSouth FloridaRestaurants OrderedShut, supra note 110 (emphasis added).
112. Franchise Opportunities, CHICK-FIL-A, http://www.chick-fil-a.com/Company/FranchiseOpportunity (last visited Apr. 7, 2015).
113. FranchiseInfo, JAMBA JUICE, http://jambafranchise.com (last visited Apr. 7, 2015) ("We
train you to manage a Jamba Juice unit, and we'll train your team to help ensure a successful
opening.... Your Region Franchise Leader will visit you regularly to ensure we are meeting your
needs on an ongoing basis."). Orkin pest care also provides its franchisees "[i]nitial training to
launch [the] business" and "[o]ngoing training for [the franchisee] staff." FranchiseOpportunities,
ORKIN, http://www.orkin.com/franchise (last visited Apr. 7, 2015).
114. Declaration of John Kimmins in Support of Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b) and 12(b)(6) of Defendants Arthur Murray International, Inc. & John Kimmins at 2,
Ziscand v. Arthur Murray International, Inc., No. 12-cv-1841 (E.D.N.Y. dismissed Jan. 21, 2015).
The author was an attorney for the plaintiff in this FLSA action against AMI and one of its franchise
locations.
115. See Obermeyer, supra note 96, at 612.
116. See id
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IV. WHY OPERATIONAL CONTROL SHOULD BE THE PRIMARY FACTOR
To DETERMINE AN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A
FRANCHISOR AND ITS FRANCHISEE'S WORKERS

This

section discusses

the reasons

operational

control over

franchisee workers' employment conditions should be the primary factor
to determine an employment relationship between a franchisor and
franchisee workers under the FLSA. This section also discusses how

holding franchisors liable as a joint employer incentivizes them to
enforce the wage laws while being able to avoid the costs of violations
committed by the franchisee.
A. Reasons to Use OperationalControlof a Franchisorfor FLSA
Liability
As defined in Irizarry, operational control is exercised over

employees if the decisions made by the person (or here, the corporation)
"directly affect the nature or conditions of the employees'
employment."" 7 Determining an employment relationship between a
franchisor and its franchisee's worker should focus on operational
control for the following reasons.
First, the broad definition of employee under the FLSA supports
A
holding a franchisor liable for exerting operational control." 8
franchisor should be considered to "suffer or permit" the work of
franchisee employees when the franchisee exerts operational control
over that work and profits from that work. The franchisor permits the
work by allowing the franchisee to operate the franchise according to the
specifications of the franchisor."' The franchisor also suffers the work
since it has the power to prevent or restrict the work through agreements
with the franchisee or policies it promulgates.1 20 The franchisee workers
are also economically dependent on the franchisor in the sense that the
franchisor's permission is needed for the continuation of the franchised
business.121 If the franchisor terminates the franchisee, a worker may

117. See Irizarry v. Catsimatidis, 722 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir. 2013).
118. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
120. See Goldstein, et al., supra note 11, at 1122 (explaining that "[e]mployers on whom
workers are economically dependent may have the power to prevent their work" and "those who fail
to use their economic power to prevent work have suffered or permitted it just like those who fail to
use their physical control").
121. See Obermeyer, supra note 96, at 620 ("In the end, however, the franchisor's ability to
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continue to work, but such work will no longer be under the control of
the franchisor, assuming the franchisee owner is not subject to a noncompete preventing him from continuing operations.1 2 2 Concluding that
a franchisor employs franchisee workers if it has operational control
over the worker's employment conditions conforms to the FLSA's broad
definition of employee, which includes those who are suffered or
permitted to work.1 23
Second, an "employer" under the FLSA "includes any person
acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to
an employee. . .
If a franchisee is considered the direct employer
of its workers, a franchisor that exerts operational control of the
franchisee's employment conditions should be considered "acting
directly or indirectly in the interest"1 2 5 of the franchisee by creating and
enforcing the franchisor's "proven business system."l2 6 Thus, the
extended definition of employer also supports that a franchisor falls
within this scope.
Third, a franchisor has the rights to the franchised business, and
delegates those rights to the franchisees to use through contractual
agreements where the franchisor retains control and oversight over the
franchisee.1 2 7 Irizarry noted that an individual (or entity) could still be
held vicariously liable for an FLSA violation, even if the individual was
not personally complicit in the particular violation.' 28 Thus, even though
the franchisor delegates much of its authority for the day-to-day
decision-making to the franchisees, if the franchisor retains and

control the franchisee's operations is most striking in the franchisor's retained right to terminate the

relationship if the franchisee's performance is inadequate. Thus, although the franchisor does not
directly manage daily operations, the franchisor holds an impressive club with which to control and
punish wayward franchisees that deviate significantly from the franchisor's wishes." (footnote
omitted)).
122. See Jason Daley, The Legal Issues that Could Change Franchising Forever,
Jim Coen, Executive
ENTREPRENEUR, Jan. 8, 2015, http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/240709.
Director of the Maine Franchise Owners Association stated that:
When push comes to shove, in most franchise agreements franchisees don't have

anything but the equipment they buy. They have no right to the name, to their customer
base, and because of noncompete clauses they can't use the skills they've learned. Yet
franchising sells units by telling people they can be in business for themselves.
Id.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2012).
Id.
Obermeyer, supra note 96, at 616.
See id. at 615-16.
See Irizarry v. Catsimatidis, 722 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir. 2013).
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asserts129 operational control over a franchisee worker's conditions of
employment, then the franchisee workers should be considered
employees of the franchisor.
Fourth, a franchisor should not be required to have the ultimate
control over a franchisee worker's employment conditions to be
considered an employer. The Second Circuit in Carter rejected the
notion that "an entity's control over a worker must be 'ultimate' in order
to justify a finding of an employer-employee relationship."' 30 As
discussed in Irizzary, to be an employer one does not need to manage
employees or even have direct contact with them.' 3 1 If a franchisor has
operational control over the uniformity of operations that affects
franchisee worker's employment conditions, then this exercise of control
should be sufficient to hold them liable as an employer. 132
Fifth, since the franchisor and franchisee have mutual interests, the
workers should be considered employees of both. A franchisee serves
the interest of the franchisor in ensuring the quality of the franchised
name, and in some instances helps strengthen the franchisor business,
enabling it to attract additional franchisees.1 33 Both the franchisor and
franchisee mutually benefit from the sales of the franchised business, the
franchisor in the form of royalties and the franchisee in the form of
potential profit.1 34 Thus, workers at a franchisee that serves the interest
of the franchisee and the franchisor should be considered employees of
both. 13

Sixth, courts in the Second Circuit need to recognize that the

129. The Second Circuit indicated in Irizarry that unexercised authority may be insufficient to
establish individual liability but declined to resolve the question. See id. at 111. Whether
unexercised authority over operational control is insufficient in the context of a franchisor involves
similar questions, but the concern between individual and corporate liability may justify a
distinction.
130. Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1984).
131. See Irizarry, 722 F.3d at 110.
132. This is not to say that if a franchisor exercises additional, more formal control over a
worker a court should not consider that in the totality of the circumstances. But even without formal
control, the exercise of operational control over a franchisee worker's employment conditions
should be sufficient so long as it is more than de minimis.
133. See Patterson v. Domino's Pizza, L.L.C., 333 P.3d 723, 733 (Cal. 2014). A franchisee
does not operate to serve only his own interest, otherwise it might be motivated to offer lower
quality of goods and services the franchisor is known for in order to make more money. See
Obermeyer, supra note 96, at 619.
134. See Obermeyer, supra note 96, at 617, 619.
135. The Supreme Court has held that the definition of employee under the FLSA "cannot be
interpreted so as to make a person whose work serves only his own interest an employee of another
person who gives him aid and instruction." Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152
(1947).
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franchise relationship differs in significant respects from the ones which
the Second Circuit has used to develop factors for analyzing joint
employment. For example, in Zheng, the Second Circuit drew factors
from Rutherford because both cases involved performing work as part of
a production line.1 36 The Second Circuit, in coming up with these six
factors, made clear that it offered them as guidance, specifically stating
that the factors, "listed in no particular order," were factors the District
Court "will find illuminating in these circumstances" and the District
Court was "free to consider any other factors." 1 37 Additionally, while
there are many similarities between the operational control of
Catsimatidis-the CEO, President, and Chairman in Irizarry-andthat
of a corporate franchisor, 38 relying on the more formal Carterfactors to
determine an employment relationship may be too restrictive; a
franchisor more often controls a worker's employment indirectly
through the policies it imposes on its franchisees. 39 Also, the higher
threshold for individual liability discussed in Irizarryis inapplicable to a
corporate franchisor. 140
Eighth, many of the factors the Second Circuit has used in other
cases support an employment relationship in the franchise context.141
Looking to the formal control factors, franchisors have the power to hire
and fire by virtue of the ability to terminate the franchise for failing to
meet standards. 142 Franchisors also supervise conditions of employment
through inspections1 4 3 and providing both employees and the public with
an avenue to address concerns.144 Depending on the particular franchise

business format, the rate of payment (or formula for determining same)
may be dictated by the franchisor. 145 Finally, a franchisor may require

136. See Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2003).
137. Id. (emphasis added).
138. See Irizarry v. Catsimatidis, 722 F.3d 99, 102, 107 (2d Cir. 2013).
139. See Obermeyer, supra note 96, at 617.
140. See Irizarry, 722 F.3d at 105, 109 ("[T]he question we confront here [is] whether an
individual within a company that undisputedly employs a worker is personally liable for damages as
that worker's 'employer."' (emphasis added)).
141. See supra Part II.B.
142. See supranotes 125-26 and accompanying text.
143. See Obermeyer, supra note 96, at 611; see also Patterson v. Domino's Pizza, L.L.C., 333
P.3d 723, 744 (Cal. 2014) (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
144. Cf Blair & Lafontaine, supra note 103, at 117-18. ("Franchisees will complain to the
franchisor about under-performing outlets and request that the franchisor intervene because they
know how a bad experience by a customer in one location can have an adverse impact throughout
the entire franchise system and ultimately on them.").
145. See id. at 62-63 ("In addition to collecting an initial franchise fee, franchisors typically
require franchisees to make ongoing payments throughout the life of their contracts.").
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the submission of employment records to determine or audit royalty
payments. 14 6
When a franchisor exerts operational control over a franchisee
worker's employment conditions, it is in essence asserting functional
control in the context of a franchisor-franchisee relationship. By
comparison, Zheng involved a relationship in the garment industry
where one company contracted with another to assemble a garment
according to the company's specifications.1 4 7 Under a franchise
relationship, the franchisee is contracting to assemble a franchise
location according to the franchisor's specifications.1 4 8 Looking to
functional control factors, the uniform format of the franchised business
can be passed from one franchisee to the next without material
changes.1 4 9 While certain equipment and real estate may be purchased
by the franchisee, the products, services, and trademarked name are
owned by the franchisor and only provided to the franchisee to use
pursuant to the terms of the franchise contract.150 The franchisee does
not shift from one franchisor to another, often because he is precluded
by agreement from competing after the franchise agreement ends.'
The franchisor also exercises oversight on the operation of the franchise
to ensure uniformity and efficient operations.1 52 Finally, while a
franchisee may have "initiative, judgment or foresight" more akin to an
independent contractor,153 the franchisee is still relying on the
franchisor's "proven business system" for success.1 5 4
Finally, the FLSA should be construed to encourage compliance
with the statute's wage requirements. The next section proposes that
imposing liability on a franchisor encourages the franchisor to be more
proactive in ensuring compliance, while not necessarily imposing
additional costs.

146. See Constantine T. Fournaris & Robert S. Burstein, The FranchiseOption, in STARTING A
NEW BUSINESS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO STARTING A NEW BUSINESS, PRACTICE, OR FRANCHISE

315, 357-58 (Pa. Bar Inst. ed., 2010) (including a clause in a sample franchise agreement which
permits the franchisor to audit documents, including employee records).
147. See Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 2003).
148. See Fournaris & Burstein, supra note 146, at 321.
149. See Blair & Fontaine, supra note 103, at 54 (explaining that franchised chains tend to use
uniform contracts for all franchisees).
150. See id. at 3-4; Daley, supra note 122.
151. See Daley, supra note 122.
152. See Blair & Fontaine, supra note 103, at 119.
153. See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1946).
154. See Obermeyer, supra note 96, at 616-17.
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B. IncreasedEnforcement and Assignment ofLiability
Franchisors should ensure compliance with those policies regarding
uniformity of operations, but if their policies affect the franchisee
workers, they should also ensure franchisee workers are paid the
required wages for their work.155 If a franchisor could be sued as a joint
employer, 156 the franchisor would be incentivized to create policies and
monitor franchisees1 5 7 for compliance with the FLSA.'5 s
Meanwhile, being held responsible as a joint employer does not
necessarily mean that the franchisor will be on the hook for a franchisee
worker's claims. Franchisors have the ability to select franchisees that
have the economic resources to ensure proper wages are paid and who
can withstand liability if there is a failure to pay. 159 A franchisor can
require franchisees to indemnify litigation and liability costs resulting

155.

Bruce Goldstein, et al., have noted that:

The purpose of the broad imposition of liability on business owners with the power to
prevent the work is to provide incentives for them to assert their power to prevent the
violations. It is presumed that the power to prevent the performance of the work carries
with it the power to allow the work, conditioned on compliance with minimum labor
standards contained in these laws.
Goldstein, et al., supra note 11, at 1137.
156. Just because a franchisor can be sued does not mean that they will be. Additionally, even

if they are named, the franchisor may just be a nominal defendant.
157. Such policies may include educating franchisees about compliance with the laws,
reviewing payroll for compliance with overtime, and a complaint system for violations. See Tiffany
Robertson, 6 Tips for Avoiding Wage-and-Hour Claims Under the FLSA, WECOMPLY (June 17,

2014), http://www.wecomply.com/post/2280715-6-tips-for-avoiding-wage-and-hour-claims
(proposing steps employers should take to ensure compliance with the FLSA).
158. Franchisors should have an existing incentive to ensure franchisees comply with wage
laws because of the negative publicity and its effect on the brand image as a result of a wage and
hour lawsuits. See Annalyn Kurtz, Subway Leads Fast Food Industry in Underpaying Workers,

CNN MONEY (May 1, 2014, 3:50 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/01/news/economy/subwaylabor-violations.
159. See
Franchise
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
http://www.fieldfisher.com/expertise/franchising/franchise-frequently-asked-questions

FIELDFISHER,
(last visited

Apr. 12, 2015) (explaining that the franchisor has complete discretion in choosing who will be
brought in as a franchisee). Joel Griswold tells employers to keep in mind that:

As a general proposition, plaintiffs look for the biggest classes and the deepest pockets.
It is only natural that they gravitate towards naming franchisors as defendants. In the
meantime, it is important for franchisors (and other entities vulnerable to being named as
joint employers) to stay current on how courts are analyzing joint employment issues in
their respective jurisdictions and to act accordingly.
Joel GriswoldHighlights Employer Liability Issues in ProfessionalSports, Unpaid Internships and
Food Franchises, FLSA LITIGATION TRACKER LITIGATOR Q&A (BLOOMBERG BNA), July 16,
2014,
at
5,
available
at

https://www.bakerlaw.com/files/uploads/Documents/News/Articles/EMPLOYMENT/2014/Griswol
dJFinalJuly2Ol4.pdf.
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from FLSA violations committed by the franchisee.1 6 0 To cover this risk
of liability, a franchisor can further require a franchisee to purchase
employment practices liability insurance that covers wage and hour
violations.'6 1 While most policies only cover the defense of wage and
hour claims, 162 some policies tailored to larger companies define "loss"
to include "defense costs, settlements, and judgments."' 63 The fact that
franchisors have the ability to require franchisees to obtain such
insurance highlights the nature of operational control they can exert'6
and why franchisors should ultimately have some responsibility for
wage violations if they are exerting operational control over employment
conditions and profiting from that work.1 6 5 As one scholar posits, "the
underlying protective statutory purposes must shape enforcement and
adjudication: identifying the employers should not be the minimumwage workers' burden." 6 6 Thus, the burden should be on the franchisor
and franchisee to distribute the potential liability among each other,
rather than obligate the franchisee worker to identify who is responsible.

160. See Fournaris & Burstein, supra note 146, at 374 (including an indemnification clause in a
sample franchise agreement); see also Goldstein, et al., supra note 11, at 1144 ("Instead, the
coliable [sic] entities should be required to work out the legal responsibility contractually through
indemnification-provided that the workers are not remitted to a remedy against a judgment-proof
labor contractor or other intermediary.").
161. See Obermeyer, supranote 96, at 639.
[I]n most cases, a franchisee's general liability insurance policy will not cover claims for
sexual harassment and discrimination. For this reason, a franchisor should require in the
franchise agreement that its franchisees maintain adequate "employment practices
liability insurance," which is specifically designed to cover employee claims of sexual
harassment. To ensure that franchisees maintain adequate coverage, franchisors should
periodically request proof of insurance from the franchisee. Moreover, the franchise
agreement should contain a provision that allows the franchisor to terminate the
relationship if a franchisee is unwilling or unable to maintain an adequate policy.
Id. Though "employment practice liability insurance (EPLI) policies typically exclude wage and
hour claims. . . . Marsh" offers a policy "designed to cover wage and hour risks typically exluded
under traditional EPLI policies."
Marsh Wage and Hour Preferred Solution, MARSH,
http://usa.marsh.com/Portals/9/Documents/WageandHourFactSheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2015).
162. See David A. Gauntlett, Insurance Coveragefor Wage and Hour Claims, LEXISNEXIS,
2014 Emerging Issues 7192 (May 2014).
163. See Marsh, supra note 161.
164. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
165. See discussion supra notes 120-22.
166. Goldstein, et al., supra note II, at 1144.
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CONCLUSION

The work performed by franchisee workers profits both the
franchisee and franchisor.1 6 7 It is not unfair to hold a franchisor
responsible for ensuring minimum and overtime wages are paid to
franchisee workers when that franchisor also asserts operational control
over aspects of the franchised business that affect the franchisee
employment conditions.1 6 8 Franchisors are also in the best position to
create policies and monitor compliance with the FLSA and can do so
without exposing themselves to additional costs.' 6 9
Thus, when
determining a franchisor's liability under the FLSA, i.e. whether there is
an employment relationship between the franchisor and franchisee
workers, the primary factor practitioners and courts should consider is
the operational control of the franchisor over the franchisee workers'
conditions of employment.

167.
168.
169.
franchise

See Obermeyer, supra note 96, at 612.
See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
Franchisors already have enforcement mechanisms in place to ensure compliance with the
agreement. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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